Nexus explainer · companion to the case study
Nexus has been reviewed three times against the standards a prop firm's technology due-diligence team would apply: automated-trading risk controls, change management, research integrity, security and resilience. Every score rests on a measurement that can be taken again, and a score that was not re-measured says so. The aim has never been to maximise the score. It has been to know where the system stands before deciding what to build next. This page shows the method, the scores, and the decisions they changed.
Scores and findings as recorded by the reviews of 29 July, 17 August and 9 September 2026. They were not re-measured for this page.
Each review is written so that the next one can repeat it. The rules below are fixed across the series, because changing them would make the scores incomparable.
A fixed audiencea prop firm, not an allocator
The reviews assume the reader is a prop desk's technology team: controls, research integrity and change management. They do not assess strategy merit, capacity or expected return; those belong to the research record.
Standards named firstheld constant across reviews
Each dimension is scored against published guidance chosen before the first review, listed below.
No score without a measurementevery finding carries its command
A score may move only on a measurement taken again at that review. A score that was not re-measured is carried forward and marked as an assertion about the earlier date, not about today.
Movement recordeda Δ and a reason for each change
A score that improves because the standard was loosened counts as a regression. A fix that shipped but did not move its score is recorded as such, not edited away.
A self-assessmentand it says so
The reviews are written by the person who built the system, with AI assistance. They substitute for an independent check without replacing one, and the scale below is built to make that limit visible.
Count only what was written herefirst-party, always
A count across the repositories gave 12,223 tests; counting only first-party code gave 11,539. The rest were vendored code and virtual environments.
| Standard | What it governs here |
|---|---|
| FIA, Best Practices for Automated Trading Risk Controls and System Safeguards (2024) | Pre- and post-trade controls, kill switches, reconciliation |
| MiFID II RTS 6; FCA reviews of algorithmic trading | Development lifecycle, algorithm inventory, change management, annual self-assessment |
| SEC Rule 15c3-5, and the Knight Capital order | Pre-trade controls; deployment governance and dead code |
| SBAI, Backtesting: Key Questions for Investors to Ask, and its small-manager standards | Overfitting controls, trial counts, cost assumptions; model risk, disaster recovery, IT security |
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 | Security controls scaled to the size of the firm |
| NFA and SEC rules on hypothetical performance | What counts as a track record |
The step that matters is from 4 to 5. Every external framework, in the end, asks whether someone other than the builder has checked the work.
Absent.
Absent or failing in practice, whatever the intent.
Partial, or present but undocumented and unevidenced.
Documented and demonstrably operating.
Evidenced in production, with the evidence retrievable on demand.
Independently verified by someone who did not build it.
While one person builds and runs Nexus, a 5 is out of reach by construction and 4 is the practical ceiling. The reviews treat that cap as a finding in its own right, not as a quirk of the scoring.
| # | Dimension | 29 Jul | 17 Aug | 9 Sep | At the latest review |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Research integrity and backtest rigour | 4 | 4 | 4 | Re-measured |
| 02 | Data lineage and point-in-time | 4 | 4 | 4 | Carried forward |
| 03 | Execution quality, cost analysis and reconciliation | 4 | 4 | 4 | Carried forward |
| 04 | Kill switch, halts and post-trade controls | 3 | 4 | 4 | Carried forward |
| 05 | Model governance, inventory and promotion | 2 | 3 | 3 | Carried forward |
| 06 | Pre-trade risk controls | 2 | 3 | 4 | Re-measured · ▲1 |
| 07 | Code quality, testing and CI | 2 | 3 | 4 | Re-measured · ▲1 |
| 08 | Change management and rollback | 2 | 3 | 4 | Re-measured · ▲1 |
| 09 | Monitoring, alerting and incidents | 2 | 4 | 4 | Carried forward |
| 10 | Security, access control and secrets | 1 | 3 | 3 | Re-measured |
| 11 | Continuity, backups and recovery | 1 | 3 | 3 | Re-measured |
| 12 | Key-person risk and governance | 1 | 2 | 2 | Carried forward |
| 13 | Track record and verifiability | 1 | 1 | 1 | Re-measured |
| Mean | 2.2 | 3.2 | 3.4 |
The value of the series is less the scores than what they pointed at. Each of these began as a finding.
A fix that shipped without moving its dimension is the most useful thing the series produces. It means the fix was aimed at a symptom.
Crash-looping alert workers were fixed, and the 17 August review still scored monitoring 2. The crash loop was never the reason for the 2: no unit had a failure handler at all. The rollout that followed took the dimension to 4 on 18 August, the score the table shows.
The whole production estate moved to a new host under control, with the old one kept, at the time, as a rollback. Continuity stayed at 3, because the cap is the recovery point, still the last daily dump at the latest review, and moving hosts does not change it.
As recorded at the 9 September review, in the order the review ranked them.
Scope discipline matters as much as the work. For a prop-desk audience, these would cost money and move nothing that matters.
The engineering programme moved the mean from 2.2 to 3.4 in six weeks. The research programme has not yet found an edge, and dimension 13 has not moved. The reviews are written to keep those two facts apart: a better-built instrument is not progress toward profit, and the average score should not be read as a distance travelled. What would change the picture is one pre-registered result that survives its own rules, with the multiplicity correction applied across the whole programme.
Sources: the technology due-diligence reviews of 29 July, 17 August and 9 September 2026, the improvement roadmap that followed the first, and the standing documents they cite: the kill-switch and entitlements record, succession and code custody, the pre-trade controls evidence, the incident register and the continuity record. These are internal documents. Scores are reproduced from them, not re-measured for this page.